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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF IN
VITRO FERTILIZATION PROCEDURES
I knew that instant that we had reached our goal: the early
stages of human life were all there in our culture fluids, just as
we wanted... and even as I gazed down at those embryos,
wondering what to do with them, there was no doubt in my
mind that the whole field was now wide open.
-Robert Edwards, British physiologist, upon witnessing his first
in vitro fertilization.
Having children is considered by many to be the greatest
achievement in a person's life. Unfortunately, statistics show
that in the United States one in eight married couples suffer
from infertility.' Traditionally, these couples were afforded two
options: either choose to remain childless, or to adopt.2 On July
' See John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 911, 911 (1996) [hereinafter Robertson, Reproductive Technology]
(citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INFERTILITY:
MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 3 (1988)). A person is diagnosed as infertile if, after
one year of unprotected sex, he or she is still unable to conceive. See id.; see also
Dan Fabricant, Note, International Law Revisited: Davis v. Davis and the Need for
Coherent Policy on the Status of the Embryo, 6 CONN. J. INTL L. 173, 174 (1990)
(noting that an estimated 2.5 million couples are involuntarily unable to conceive
children).
2 See Robertson, Reproductive Technology, supra note 1, at 911; Duane R. Valz,
Book Review, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 201, 202 (1995) (reviewing JOHN A. ROBERTSON,
CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES)
(describing adoption as "an expensive, time consuming, and legally arduous proc-
ess"); see also ATHENA LIU, ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 1
(1991) (noting that "the number of babies available for adoption has been declining
since the 1970s"). Liu cited four reasons for this decline: "(1) the widespread use of
contraceptives devices, (2) the increase in the number of abortions, (3) changing at-
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25, 1978, the birth of Louise Brown in England added one more
option and gave new hope to infertile couples worldwide.3
Louise was "conceived" in a sterile laboratory with neither
her mother nor her father present. This was the first child con-
ceived through the process of in vitro fertilization ("IVF"), with
her life beginning in a petri dish rather than in her mother's
body.4 With the advent of IVF, infertile couples were now af-
forded the ability to conceive, gestate and give birth to biologi-
cally related offspring.5 Louise's birth marked a turning point in
the "technological reproductive revolution,"' which began over a
decade earlier when the development of the birth control pill
made sexual intercourse without procreation possible.7 IVF,
along with other assisted reproductive procedures, has paralleled
this continuum by effectively making procreation without sexual
intercourse possible! As a result of this breakthrough, "the de-
cision to have or not have children is... no longer a matter of
God or nature, but has been made subject to human will and
titudes to, and state support for, single parents, and (4) the freer availability of
sterilization." Id. (citation omitted).
3 See Sam Thatcher & Alan DeCherney, Pregnancy-Inducing Technologies: Bio-
logical and Medical Implications, in WOMEN AND NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECH-
NOLOGIES: MEDICAL, PSYCHOSOCIAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS 27 (Judith
Rodin & Aila Collins eds., 1991) (noting that this date "marked the birth of a new
reproductive technology that has revolutionized the therapy of the infertile couple").
See generally, L. BROWN & J. BROWN, OUR MIRACLE CHILD CALLED LOUISE, A
PARENT'S STORY (1979).
4 See PETER SINGER & DEANE WELLS, MAKING BABIES: THE NEW SCIENCE AND
ETHICS OF CONCEPTION at viii (1985) (discussing the basic IVF process "as seen
through the eyes of a couple taking part in it" and examining the ethical debate sur-
rounding the technique); see also Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tenn. 1992)
(discussing the process of IVF); infra notes 16-28 and accompanying text (same).
r See Robertson, Reproductive Technology, supra note 1, at 911 ("The first
American birth resulting from in vitro fertilization occurred in 1981. By 1988,
15,000 stimulated lVF cycles occurred in more than 100 clinics. In 1994, more than
300 clinics performed more than 35,000 cycles, resulting in more than 6,000 births.")
(citations omitted).
6 JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW RE-
PRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 4 (1994) [hereinafter ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF
CHOICE].
7See ROBERT H. BLANK, REGULATING REPRODUCTION 24 (1990) (noting how the
pill and other contraceptives caused the separation of reproduction from sexual in-
tercourse in the 1960's).
" See ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 6, at 5 (stating that the
majority of human reproduction will continue to occur in the traditional manner but
that the development of IVF and other reproductive options are truly revolution-
ary).
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technical expertise."9
Recent advances in reproductive technologies have created
ways to achieve parenthood for a variety of people whose efforts
heretofore had been unsuccessful. Such advances have also cre-
ated a great deal of controversy concerning the moral, ethical,
and legal implications which surround the use of these proce-
dures.0 As reliance on IVF becomes more widespread and ac-
ceptable, debates focus on its practical uses and the many scien-
tific advances which JVF makes possible. Two such procedures,
embryo cryopreservation and embryo surrogacy, have become the
subject of much controversy." There are two divergent views re-
garding these medical advances: those anxious for expansions on
the range of procreative opportunities available to the infertile
applaued the procedures12 and those who condemn them for per-
verting the sanctity of nature, human life, and the procreative
process. 3 At the heart of this controversy lies the issue of
whether the established right to procreate coitally should extend
to encompass a fundamental right to noncoital procreation. This
issue, although mentioned tangentially in cases regarding IVF
procedures, 4 has not been explicitly dealt with by any court.
As the combination of IVF and cryopreservation allow for
9 Id.
10 See John A. Robertson, Decisional Authority Over Embryos and Control of
IVF Technology, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 285, 285 (1988) [hereinafter Robertson, Deci-
sional Authority]. See generally SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 23-89 (discussing
the ethical debate surrounding IVF).
" See discussion infra Parts Il, IV (examining the controversy surrounding
embryo cryopreservation and embryo surrogacy).
1See Robertson, Decisional Authority, supra note 10, at 285, 289-93 (arguing
that infertile couples should have a fundamental right to procreate noncoitally and
that restrictions on noncoital reproduction by an infertile couple should only be
permitted if a compelling state interest standard is met).
13 See LIU, supra note 2, at 48-50; see also M. Donaldson, The Control of Repro-
ductive Research, in REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE AND THE LAW 153, 157 (A. Allan
Templeton & Douglas J. Cusine eds., 1990) (questioning "whether it is every
woman's inalienable right to have a child regardless of the means used to produce it
and whether the future welfare of any baby is not paramount to this wish"). Donald-
son states that infertility treatment should only be offered to married couples, or
those in a long term relationship analogous to marriage. See id. Donaldson argues
that a different situation arises with respect to single women who "deliberately pro-
duc[e] the single parent syndrome when the public acceptance is still of the two-
parent family as a unit." Id.
14 See infra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing Smith v. Hartigan, an
Illinois District Court case that came close to deciding whether a fundamental right
to IVF exists).
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the embryo to exist outside of the womb, lower courts have had
to address issues concerning the rights of the various parties in-
volved in the IVF process. These courts have considered which
parties' rights prevail in the context of parental disagreement
over the disposition of the embryos, whether there exists any
individual rights of the embryo, and the legality of enforcing sur-
rogacy contracts.' 5
This Note examines the traditional constitutional basis for
procreative freedom and discusses various arguments for the ex-
tension of this right to noncoital reproduction. Part I briefly in-
troduces the medical process for IVF. Part II overviews the his-
torical basis for the rights of privacy and procreation, and argues
that these rights should be extended to noncoital reproduction.
Part III of this Note examines the legal status accorded to the
embryo arising from the utilization of cryopreservation, and the
conflicts arising among the various parties involved in IVF pro-
cedures. Part IV discusses gestational surrogacy, a process in
which a third party gestates the embryo, and summarizes the
debates that surround this type of procedure. Part V provides a
brief look at future implications concerning IVF procedures.
I. MEDICAL PROCEDURE FOR IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
"Literally meaning 'fertilization in a glass,' ,,16 IVF was origi-
nally developed to bypass damaged fallopian tubes, where fertili-
zation naturally occurs. 7  The IVF process takes place over a
two-week period in four stages: ovulation induction, egg re-
trieval, fertilization, and embryo transfer. 8 During the first
stage, ovulation induction, the woman is given a combination of
5 See infra notes 138-52, and accompanying text (discussing court decisions ad-
dressing the rights of the embryos, the disposition of embryos, and the rights of
parties in surrogacy contracts).
16 Elizabeth Ann Pitrolo, Comment, The Birds, The Bees, and the Deep Freeze: Is
There International Consensus In the Debate Over Assisted Reproductive Technolo-
gies?, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 147, 152 (1996) (citing ARTHUR L. WISOT & DAVID R.
MELDRUM, NEW OPTIONS FOR FERTILITY 3 (1990)).
' See LIU, supra note 2, at 12; Thatcher & DeCherney, supra note 3, at 27; see
also THE JOHNS HOPKINS HANDBOOK OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 153 (Marian D. Damewood, M.D. ed., 1990)
[hereinafter JOHNS HOPKINS HANDBOOK].
'8 See JOHNS HOPKINS HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 153. See generally Thatcher
& DeCherney, supra note 3, at 28-33 (labeling the four stages as: "augmentation of
folliculogenesis," "capture of oocytes," "culture techniques," and "transfer of the con-
ceptus").
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hormones to stimulate her ovaries and facilitate the production
of multiple eggs.19 The eggs are then surgically removed by ei-
ther a laparoscopy or ultrasound-directed needle aspiration."0 If
the doctor determines that the procedure has produced usable
ova, the eggs are placed in a petri dish, where treated sperm are
introduced.21 Insemination occurs upon this placement of the
sperm and eggs together; fertilization, the actual joinder of the
sperm and egg, occurs four to eight hours later.' The first fertil-
ized egg divides into two cells approximately eighteen hours
later and shortly thereafter subdivides again into a pre-
implantation embryo, or simply, a preembryo.' At this four or
eight-cell stage one to three preembryos are transferred into the
woman's uterus through insertion of a catheter via the cervix.
2 4
In successful IVF, at least one of the preembryos implants into
the uterine wall, and subsequently develops into a fetus.'
IVF differs from artificial insemination, which is the tradi-
tional procedure whereby an egg is fertilized and implanted into
the intended rearing mother. IVF makes the separation of ges-
tational and genetic motherhood possible, through egg and em-
'9 The procedure whereby a woman's ovaries are stimulated to produce multiple
eggs is characterized as superovulation. See Bill E. Davidoff, Comment, Frozen Em-
bryos: A Need for Thawing in the Legislative Process, 47 SMU L. REV. 131, 134
(1993).
20 See Alise R. Panitch, Note, The Davis Dilemma: How to Prevent Battles Over
Frozen Preembryos, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 543, 547 (1991). Laparoscopy is per-
formed under a mild general anesthetic and requires two or three short incisions to
be made in the abdomen. The newer technique, aspiration, only requires a local an-
esthetic. Aspiration involves the insertion of a suctioning needle through the abdo-
men and bladder, or through the vagina. See ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN, IN VITRO
FERTILIzATION: BUILDING POLIcY FROM LABORATORIES TO LEGISLATURES 148-49
(1989).
21 See Jennifer Marigliano Dehmel, Note & Comment, To Have or Not to Have:
Whose Procreative Rights Prevail In Disputes Over Dispositions of Frozen Embryos,
27 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1381 (1995).
22 See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *23 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept.
21, 1989) (discussing testimony of Dr. Charles Alex Shivers).
23 See BONNICKSEN, supra note 20, at 150.
24 See id. at 161. The embryos are implanted prior to differentiating and devel-
oping nervous and organ systems. See id. There is a one in ten chance that any sin-
gle transferred embryo will implant in the woman's uterus. See John A. Robertson,
Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Repro-
duction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 942, 970 n.100 (1986). If menstruation has not occurred
after two weeks, doctors perform a blood test to determine if the chemical changes
signaling pregnancy have commenced. See BONNICKSEN, supra note 20, at 151.
25 See Dehmel, supra note 21, at 1381.
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bryo donation and gestational surrogacy.5 Women who have
functioning ovaries, but who have either no uterus or cannot
safely carry a child to term, may seek to have an embryo, which
was created with her egg, carried or "gestated" by another
woman.27 Unlike the situations in which the surrogate mother is
both the genetic and gestational mother, the gestational surro-
gate bears no biological tie to the child.28
Gestational surrogacy in the IVF context is made possible by
recent advancements in the process of cryopreservation. Cryo-
preservation allows for the remaining preembryos, which had
not been immediately transferred to the uterus, to be preserved
and stored for later implantation.29 Cryopreservation is achieved
by cooling and dehydrating an embryo in preparation for its long-
term preservation in a frozen state.0 When the IVF patient is
ready for implantation, the embryo is thawed through rehydra-
tion before being transferred to the uterus."' The survival rate of
the cryopreserved embryos after the thawing process is approxi-
mately fifty percent. 2
The benefits of cryopreservation include: (1) cost reduction;3
26 See ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 6, at 9.
27 See id.
28 See id.; see also MARY WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LIFE: THE WARNOCK RE-
PORT ON HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY 42 (1985) (discussing various
surrogacy procedures).
29 Cryopreservation is the process of preserving preembryos by freezing them in
liquid nitrogen at sub-zero temperatures. See Marcia J. Wurmbrand, Note, Frozen
Embryos: Moral, Social, and Legal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1083
(1986).
3' See JOHNS HOPKINS HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 142; Thatcher &
DeCherney, supra note 3, at 34 (summarizing briefly the process of cryopreserva-
tion); see also Davidoff, supra note 19, at 134-35. The embryo is suspended in an
aqueous medium and chemically treated with a cryoprotectant. See JOHNS HOPKINS
HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 142-43; see also SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 81
(noting that the embryos are frozen in liquid nitrogen at -321 degrees Fahrenheit).
The cryoprotectant replaces the water in the cells when they are dehydrated and
prevents the formation of ice crystals which can cause tissue damage. See JOHNS
HOPKINS HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 143. The embryo is cooled in stages to -80
degrees Celsius, and subsequently transferred to liquid nitrogen whereupon it is
rapidly cooled to -196 decrees Celsius for long-term storage. See SINGER & WELLS,
supra note 4, at 81 (noting that this temperature allows the embryos to "remain fro-
zen, without deteriorating, virtually indefinitely-six hundred years, according to
one estimate").
31 See Davidoff, supra note 19, at 134.
2 See id.
33 See Jennifer L. Carow, Note, Davis v. Davis: An Inconsistent Exception to An
Otherwise Sound Rule Advancing Procreational Freedom and Reproductive Tech-
[Vol. 72:417
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(2) lessened physical suffering; (3) egg storage for women who
fear future damage to their ovaries or eggs; (4) reduction in the
risk of a multiple pregnancies; (5) time to decide proper disposi-
tion of the surplus embryos;"' and, most importantly, (6) an in-
crease in chance of pregnancy. 5 As discussed in Part III, how-
ever, cryopreservation has been the subject of much debate.
II. TRADITIONAL RIGHTS OF PRIVACY AND PROCREATION
A. The Right to Privacy
Although the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee a
blanket right to privacy, the judiciary has recognized that every
individual possesses such a right to privacy, which encompasses
a variety of "fundamental personal rights."36 As early as 1891,
the Supreme Court stated "[no right is held more sacred, or is
more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own per-
son... ,,"" This early notion of a protection against interference
with one's person was termed by Justice Brandeis, in his dissent-
ing opinion in Olmstead v. United States,38 as "the right to be left
alone."39
The Court afforded this common law notion constitutional
stature in its landmark 1965 decision Griswold v. Connecticut,40
wherein it struck down a Connecticut statute which banned the
use of contraceptive devices." The Griswold Court held that in
addition to the specific rights protected in the Constitution, the
nology, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 523, 529 (1994). Cryopreservation allows for unused
fertilized eggs to be preserved for later implantation. Since "the IVF process is
costly [approximately $3,000-$5,000 for each egg retrieval] ... the fewer egg re-
trievals a woman undergoes, the better." Id.
34 The issue often then becomes whether to destroy or donate the surplus em-
bryos. See id. at 529-30.
"Cryopreservation allows for the implantation of the embryo during the
woman's normal menstrual cycle when her body is free from the drugs, anesthesia,
and hormonal hyperstimulation, which were administered during the egg retrieval
process. See id. at 530.
' Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
'7 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
"8 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
9 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (deeming such to be "the most compre-
hensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men").40 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4' Id. at 485-86.
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First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments created a pe-
numbral "zone of privacy," which provided the freedom to make
various personal decisions without substantial government inter-
ference.42 Intimate decisions made within the husband-wife re-
lationship fall within this zone, and a statute prohibiting the use
of contraceptives "seeks to achieve its goals by means having a
maximum destructive impact upon that relationship."" The
Court found the statute to be overly broad because it intruded on
fundamental and protected freedoms."
The Supreme Court expanded this holding in Eisenstadt v.
Baird," in which it invalidated a Massachusetts statute limiting
the sale of contraceptives to married couples." While refusing to
rule on whether a right of access to contraceptives existed,47 the
Eisenstadt Court held that the privacy regarding birth control
decisions afforded married couples in Griswold extended also to
unmarried individuals.48 The Court added, "[ilf the right of pri-
vacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."'  Similarly, the Supreme
Court in Carey v. Population Services International," struck
down a New York law which prohibited the distribution of con-
traceptives to individuals under the age of sixteen.5' In invali-
dating the statute, the Court stated that "the Constitution pro-
tects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from
unjustified intrusion by the State. Restrictions on the distribu-
tion of contraceptives clearly burden the freedom to make such
decisions."52
42 See id. at 484.
43 Id. at 485.
"Id. For such a statute to be valid, the state must show "a subordinating inter-
est which is compelling." Id. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring). In the absence of such
a compelling interest, the statute cannot be upheld. See id.
45 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
4Id. at 454-55.
17 The Court held the statute unconstitutional without the need to address this
issue. See id. at 453.
Id at 453-54 (finding the classification to violate the Equal Protection
Clause).
49 Id. at 453.
ro 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
6' Id. at 681-82.
52 1& at 687.
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In the 1970's, the Supreme Court further expanded the right
to privacy to include the decision to terminate a pregnancy. The
landmark case of Roe v. Wade 3 held that a woman's right to pri-
vacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy.", 4 The Court rejected the no-
tion that this right was absolute, and reserved to the states the
power to intervene when the state's interest in the protection of
the health and safety of the mother and the unborn child out-
weighed the mother's privacy interest.
5
Mirroring the right to avoid pregnancy, both before and after
the point of conception, is an individual's right to procreate. 6 The
judiciary appears to recognize the right to procreate as emanat-
ing from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.57 In Meyer v. Nebraska,58 the Supreme Court recognized
the "liberty" aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment to intend, "not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual... to marry, establish a home and bring up chil-
dren... and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men."59 Subsequently, the Court in Skinner v. Okla-
homa6 0 stated that marriage and procreation were "one of the
basic civil rights of man... fundamental to the very existence
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4 Id- at 153.
65 See id. at 154-55 ("Where certain fundamental rights' are involved, the Court
has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling
state interest' ") (citations omitted). While the holding of Roe has been modified in
more recent Court decisions, the essential holding relating to a woman's right to
choose, prior to viability, remains good law. See Casey v. Planned Parenthood of S.E.
Pa., 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
66 John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean To Be A "Parent"? The Claims of Bi-
ology As the Basis For Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 366 n.56 (1991)
(stating that "the right to procreation... [has] all the indicia of a privacy right").
57 "No state shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
262 U.S. 390 (1923). The Meyer Court dealt with a Nebraska statute which
prohibited the teaching of a foreign language in a public or private school to a child
who had not yet passed the eighth grade. Id- at 396-97. The liberty being impacted
was that of the teacher's right to teach, and the right of the students' parents to hire
him to teach their children. See i& at 400. While the Court did not expressly apply a
strict scrutiny test, it struck down the law as "arbitrary and without reasonable re-
lation to any end within the competency of the state." Id. at 403.
69 Id at 399 (citations omitted).
60316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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and survival of the race." 1 Although the case was ultimately
decided on equal protection grounds, it is often cited as evidence
of a judicially-recognized right to procreate.62
B. Extending the Reach of the Right to Procreate
While there is apparent legal support for a fundamental
right to coital procreation, the Supreme Court has never ruled on
whether non-coital procreation conducted by assisted reproduc-
tive technologies also merits such protection.' Personal rights
that may be deemed as "fundamental" are those liberties that
are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' While
the breadth of the right to privacy since its initial recognition in
Griswold has been expanded, the Supreme Court in recent years
has demonstrated a reluctance to further expand this right:
[We are not] inclined to take a more expansive view of our
authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the
Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and comes
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitu-
tional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
design of the Constitution... There should be, therefore, great
resistance to expand the substantive reach of those Clauses,
particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights
deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily
takes to itself further authority to govern the country without
61 Id. at 541.
"Skinner involved an Oklahoma statute which imposed forced sterilization on
"habitual criminals" convicted of two or more felonies involving "moral turpitude."
Id. at 536. However, the statute exempted individuals convicted of various white
collar crimes, including embezzlement and bribery. See id. at 538-39. The Court held
that since the law discriminated between various types of felony convicts, it was a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at
541-42. Nonetheless, the Court's emphasis on the importance of the right to procre-
ate has been incorporated into substantive due process analysis as part of the right
to privacy established in Griswold. See Hill, supra note 56, at 366. In addition,
"Skinner remains the only Supreme Court decision explicitly addressing the right of
procreation." Id. at 367.
63The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois came closest in
directly deciding whether a fundamental right to IVF exists in the 1983 case of
Smith v. Hartigan, 556 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ill. 1983). The issue in Hartigan was
whether a statute which appeared to prohibit IVF was a violation of the plaintiff's
fundamental right to privacy. Id. at 159. However, upon the defendant's contention
that the statute in question did not in fact prohibit the act of causing in vitro fertili-
zation, the case was dismissed due to a lack of a case or controversy. See id. at 164.
64 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
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express constitutional authority.0
There is presently no statutory law in the United States
which directly prohibits IVF, in fact, as most states have de-
clined to address the issue at all.' Yet until the Supreme Court
expressly holds that non-coital procreation falls within an indi-
vidual's right to privacy, the possibility exists for states to place
restrictions on the processes of IVF so as to effectively prohibit
many infertile individuals from utilizing assisted reproduction
technologies.
There is evidence that lower courts are willing to recognize a
right to non-coital procreation. In striking down a law that
placed restrictions on the treatment of embryos, the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois noted in Lifchez v.
Hartigan,' "[iut takes no great leap of logic to see that within the
cluster of constitutionally protected choices that includes the
right to have access to contraceptives, there must be included
within that cluster the right to submit to a medical procedure
that may bring about, rather than prevent, pregnancy."" The
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio was even more
explicit in Cameron v. Board of Education,70 stating that Su-
preme Court precedent in the field of privacy rights guarantees a
woman the right to control her own reproductive functions and
thus control her desire to become pregnant by artificial insemi-
nation.7
Surely the Meyer, Skinner and Griswold Courts did not con-
template the development of a procreative alternative to sexual
intercourse. This should not preclude the extension of the pro-
tections guaranteed by those cases to non-coital procreation.
Failure to extend this protection of the right to privacy to as-
sisted reproductive technologies would be to disregard the under-
lying principle of procreative freedom, namely the right of a per-
6Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986).
"See infra notes 121-37 and accompanying text (discussing state statutes
dealing with IVF).
7See infra notes 121-37 and accompanying text.
735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
"Id. at 1377. The Lifchez court dealt with a statute which prohibited the sale of
or experimentation with a fetus, unless such experimentation was "therapeutic." See
id. at 1363. While the court struck down the law on several grounds, it held that the
law violated a woman's fundamental privacy right-the "right to make reproductive
choices free of governmental interference with those choices." Id at 1376.
"0 795 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
1 Id. at 237.
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son to have children.72 Thus, the right to procreative assistance
should be deemed fundamental.
Fundamental rights, however, are not absolute and may be
intruded upon if a compelling state interest exists.73 The state
should be required to assert a compelling justification when it
attempts to restrict access to IVF for select groups, such as un-
married individuals. The state may assert an interest in pre-
serving traditional notions of family to justify limiting access to
IVF by unmarried individuals. 74 Arguably, married couples pre-
sent a more compelling justification for extending fundamental
status to procreation with assisted technology than do unmar-
ried individuals, due to the traditional correlation of marriage
with "family."75 Indeed, in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,76 the Court
restricted the interpretation of family to "the historic respect-
indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term-traditionally
accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary
72See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (stating
that "[tihis Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment").
See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (stating that states
cannot constitutionally interfere directly and substantially with the right to marry
without a compelling state interest). The means used to enforce the state interest
must be narrowly tailored to only that interest when it interferes with a fundamen-
tal right. See id. at 388; see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 16 (1973) (stating that in the instances of fundamental rights, a state regu-
lation is not presumptively valid and that states carry a "heavy burden of justifica-
tion") (citations omitted).
7 See Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Threat to the
Traditional Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 958-59 (1996) (stating that "[alt the most
obvious level, assisted reproductive technologies enable the formation of families by
gay men, lesbians, single people, and post-menopausal women, visibly assaulting
the traditional image of the two-parent, heterosexual, biologically-connected fam-
ily"). Interestingly, however, Professor Rao suggests that even when employed by
married individuals, "assisted reproductive technologies insidiously undermine the
traditional paradigm from within." Id. at 959.
75See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that "[miarriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race"); see
also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (noting that the statute ban-
ning contraceptives "is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship"). Although the Griswold Court explicitly extended the privacy right to
unmarried individuals in the context of contraceptives, it did so only on equal pro-
tection grounds and, "[left] open the possibility that the state may discover more
rational reasons why unmarried persons should not reproduce, by either coitus or
assisted reproductive technologies." Roger J. Chin, M.D., Assisted Reproductive
Technologies: Legal Issues in Procreation, 8 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 190, 205 (1996).
76 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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family."" Based on this statement of the Court, one can argue
that the traditional understanding of procreation only encom-
passed married procreation, and therefore, any extension of a
right to the utilization of assisted reproductive techniques should
only be given to married couples.
Notwithstanding traditional notions of family, an infertile
individual's"8 interest in having a child does not appear any less
compelling than a fertile person's.79 The antiquated rationale
relied upon in Michael H. is not applicable in today's societal
make-up. The 1990 Census of Population reported that there
were over three million "unmarried partner households" of the
opposite sex in the United States.80 In In re Adoption of Camilla,
the court allowed the petitioner eligible to adopt a child who was
a product of TVF; the petitioner was the biological mother's les-
bian partner.8' The court stated:
To suggest that adoption petitions may not be filed by unmar-
ried partners of the same or opposite sex because the legislature
has only expressed a desire for these adoptions to occur in the
traditional nuclear family constellation of the 1930's ignores the
77Id. at 123. Justice Scalia's opinion relied on the sanctity given the "family"
throughout history, rather than some biological formula that might include
"biological fatherhood plus an established parental relationship." Id. Note, however,
that some state courts disagree with the Supreme Court's definition of "family," and
find a broader definition on either statutory or state common law grounds. See, e.g.,
G.F.C. v. S.G., 686 So. 2d 1382, 1385-86 (Fla. App. Dist. Ct. 1997) (declining to fol-
low Michael H. on state law grounds); State ex rel. Roy Allen S. v. Stone, 474 S.E.2d
554, 562 (W. Va. 1996) (declining to follow Michael H.); Michael M. v. Giovanna F., 7
Cal. Rptr. 2d 460, 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (same); Jones v. Trojak, 586 A.2d 397,
399 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding Michael H. superseded by state statute), affd,
634 A.2d 201 (Pa. 1993).
78 The term "individual," rather than "couple," is used throughout the remainder
of this Note because of this author's belief that the right to procreation through as-
sisted reproductive technology should extend to married and unmarried individuals
alike. The Supreme Court's invalidation of legal presumptions favoring married per-
sons in contraception and child-rearing cases, is evidence that they would likely
subject distinctions relating to procreation to heightened scrutiny.
79 See Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmar-
ried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669, 679 (1985) (stating that "[tihe reasons for having a
child-to love and be loved by that child, to educate and convey personal ideals and
values, to contribute a part of oneself to future generations-do not turn on marital
status").
80 In re Adoption of Camilla, 620 N.Y.S.2d 897, 901 (Faro. Ct. 1994) (citing U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population, CP-2, Social and Economic Char-
acteristics (1993)).8' See id. at 899.
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reality of what is happening in the population. 2
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Carey v. Population
Services Int'l, stated "protect[ing] individual decisions in matters
of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State," empha-
sizes that there is no inferior procreative right for unmarried
persons.' Therefore, any right to technically assisted procrea-
tion should be granted to unmarried individuals as well as mar-
ried couples.
Another Equal Protection issue regarding the right to non-
coital procreation may arise in the context of wealth classifica-
tions. Case law exists establishing that the fundamental right to
avoid undue interference with one's ability to prevent or termi-
nate a pregnancy does not impose an affirmative obligation on
the part of the state to provide the poor with the means neces-
sary to achieve this end.' It would appear that, in the same
Id. at 901-02 (emphasis added). The court also noted that the adoption in this
case served the state's purpose, "to provide for a child's financial and emotional se-
curity." Id. at 902 (footnote omitted). Moreover, the court recognized that the social
stigma attached to illegitimacy has been nearly eliminated. See id. at 901.Carey v. Population Svcs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977). The use of IVF has
been restricted by individual clinics to exclude many unmarried and homosexuals.
As noted previously, the extension of Griswold in the holdings of Eisenstadt and
Carey laid the foundation for extending the right to non-coital procreation to un-
married individuals. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. At times, courts
have been pressured to extend this right to homosexuals. Due to the Supreme
Court's determination that homosexuals are neither an immutable class nor politi-
cally powerless, subsequent courts have employed rational basis review in evaluat-
ing discriminatory classifications. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec.
Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that while classifications
of race, national origin, or alienage have been subject to strict scrutiny, homosexual-
ity has never enjoyed such a privilege); see also Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 63 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (using rational basis review to strike down regulation barring homosexu-
als from naval service, but reserving question of whether homosexuals would qualify
as a quasi-suspect class), affd sub nom. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir.
1994). But see Baehr v. Miike, CIV No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 at *17 (Hawaii Cir.
Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (determining that denial of same-sex marriages was violative of the
equal protection clause and noting that "[g]ay and lesbian parents and same-sex
couples are allowed to adopt children, provide foster care and to raise and care for
children .... [They] can provide children with a nurturing... environment which is
conducive to the development of happy, healthy and well-adjusted children,...
[and] can be as fit and loving parents, as non-gay men and women .... "), order affd
950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997).
' See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (holding that the constitutional
right to an abortion does not impose an affirmative obligation upon the government
to provide the financial resources necessary to exercise the right by subsidizing
abortions because, "although government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own
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fashion, recognizing a fundamental right to noncoital procreation
would create no duty on the part of the state to provide funding
for the utilization of these services.
III. CRYOPRESERVATION AND THE RIGHTS OF PREEMBRYOS
In addition to the rights of IVF participants, the techniques
of assisted reproduction give rise to a new class of entities, hu-
man preembryos, with legal rights yet to be determined. The
controversy surrounding noncoital reproduction has increased
due to advances in reproductive technology, especially the devel-
opment of cryopreservation.' IVF has created the possibility
that viable human embryos might be created and never given the
opportunity to realize their potential as living human beings.
Because the cryopreservation process "allow[s] the embryo to
survive outside the womb [for extended lengths of time], situa-
tions such as death, divorce, or disagreement between couples
[prior to implantation] raise... questions regarding the even-
tual disposition of the... embryo."6
A. International Response to Cryopreservation of Embryos
Unlike the United States, other countries have actively ad-
dressed the moral and legal issues surrounding cryopreserva-
tion. The United Kingdom and Australia have been the forerun-
ners in establishing committees to consider the social, ethical,
and legal implications of assisted reproduction technologies.87
Australia established the Waller Committee' in response to the
creation"); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) (holding that the constitu-
tional right to an abortion is only a negative "right protect[ing] the woman from...
interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. It
implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public
funds").
"See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text (discussing the process of cryo-
preservation).
"Davidoff, supra note 19, at 132. Davidoff states that a large part of the prob-
lem is that patients, clinics, and doctors rarely agree on the best way to dispose of
unused embryos. Id.
"The United Kingdom established the Department of Health and Social Secu-
rity Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (the "Warnock
Committee") in 1982. See WARNOCK, supra note 28, at vi. In Australia, the State of
Victoria established the Committee to Consider the Social, Ethical and Legal Issues
Arising from In Vitro Fertilization (the "Waller Committee") which issued a report
in 2984. See Pitrolo, supra note 16 at 177.
"See Pitrolo, supra note 16, at 177. Named after Professor Louis Waller, the
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issues raised by the Rios dilemma, a situation which developed
in part due to lack of legislation concerning cryopreservation.8 9
In 1981, Mario and Elsa Rios traveled from the United States to
Australia in order to undergo IVF treatment.90 Three eggs were
fertilized, one of which was transferred to Mrs. Rios while the
other two were stored cryogenically in the Australian clinic.91
Tragically, Mr. and Mrs. Rios were killed in a plane crash in
1984.92 The Rioses' two remaining frozen embryos became the
subject of controversy because they neither executed a will nor
signed an embryo disposition agreement.93 The issue of the dis-
position of the embryos arose as to whether they could be,
"discarded, transferred to another couple, considered heirs and
eligible to inherit part of the Rioses' estate through intestacy
law, or considered part of the Rioses' estate itself."' Resolution
of this issue clearly turned on what legal status the embryos
were to be accorded. In 1984, the Waller Committee, in its Re-
port on the Disposition of Embryos Produced by In Vitro Fertili-
zation,95 recommended that although the embryo should not be
afforded the status of" 'personhood,'... it merits more respect
than an entity created solely for research purposes."9"
The Waller Committee report laid the foundation for the
State of Victoria's Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act-the first
ever attempt in the world to regulate IVF.97 The Act, in one of its
few deviations from the recommendations of the Waller Commit-
tee, required that, upon the consent of the egg and sperm donors,
the unused embryos be made available for transfer to another
couple.98
chairman, the committee was comprised of experts from the fields of law, religion,
and science. See Davidoff, supra note 19, at 156 n.215.
8See NEW APPROACHES TO HUMAN REPRODUCTION: SOcIAL AND ETHICAL
DIMENSIONS 5 (Linda M. Whiteford & Marilyn L. Poland eds., 1989); Davidoff, supra
note 19, at 156; Pitrolo, supra note 16, at 178.
go See Davidoff, supra note 19, at 156.
9' See id.
2 See Pitrolo, supra note 16, at 178.
9See id. The Rioses left behind an adult child and a sizable estate. See id. at
177. The implanted embryo had not resulted in a live birth. See Davidoff, supra note
19, at 156; Fabricant, supra note 1, at 183.
9Davidoff, supra note 19, at 156.
5 See id. at 156 n.218 and accompanying text.
96 Fabricant, supra note 1, at 181; see also Pitrolo, supra note 16, at 178.
97 See Pitrolo, supra note 16, at 178-79.
98 See id. at 179. The Committee originally recommended that the unused em-
bryos be discarded. See id.
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Unlike the Waller Committee, which was established in
large part in response to the Rios dilemma, the United Kingdom
established the Department of Health and Social Security
Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology
(the "Warnock Committee") to examine the general ethical impli-
cations of new developments in the field of reproductive tech-
niques.99 Two years after its formation, the Warnock Committee
found that, "the human embryo.., is not, under the present law
in the UK accorded the same status as a living child or an adult,
nor do we necessarily wish it to be accorded that same status."'00
Nevertheless, the Warnock Committee recommended that the
embryo be accorded a "special status"' and made sixty-four rec-
ommendations to Parliament regarding the application of poli-
cies and safeguards to new developments in human fertiliza-
tion.10 2  In 1990, Parliament relied on the suggestions of the
Warnock Committee to pass the Human Fertilisation and Em-
bryology Act.' This Act limited research on embryos to the first
fourteen days after fertilization as suggested by the Warnock
Committee and mandated the destruction of human embryos af-
ter they are stored for five years."
B. Domestic Response to Cryopreservation of Embryos
In contrast to these comprehensive directives, the United
See Davidoff, supra note 19, at 157. Led by Dame Mary Warnock, the Com-
mittee was made up of members from medical and health-care professions, and re-
ligious and ethical groups from Scotland, Wales, Ireland, and Great Britain. See Pi-
trolojsupra note 16, at 173.WARNOCK, supra note 28, § 11.17 at 63; see also Christine D. Atmen, Com-
ment, Disputes Over Frozen Embryos: Who Wins, Who Loses, and How Do We De-
cide?-An Analysis of Davis v. Davis, York v. Jones, and State Statutes Affecting
Reproductive Choices, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1299, 1314 (1991) (noting that "[i]n
1979, the Ethics Advisory Board of the Department of Health and Human Services
determined that the human embryo is entitled to profound respect, but this respect
does not necessarily encompass the full legal and moral rights attributed to persons'
") (footnote omitted).
101 See WARNOCK, supra note 28, § 11.17 at 63.
' See id. at 63, 80-86. Among the recommendations was that a licensing
authority be created to regulate research and artificial reproductive technologies,
and legal limits on the use of human embryos in research. See id. at 80. The Com-
mittee concluded that, absent unacceptable risks, IVF and cryogenic preservation
should be viewed as acceptable techniques for treatment of infertility. See id. § 7.4
at 40; see also id. § 10.3 at 53-54.
1" See Pitrolo, supra note 16, at 175. The Warnock Report's recommendations
were also used as the basis of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985. See id.
104 See id. at 176.
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States has been slow to legislate in the field of IVF or cryo-
preservation. Recently, the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and
Certification Act of 199205 legislated that clinics engaging in IVF
procedures report the exact numbers of procedures performed
and the resulting number of live births occurring."6 This was
designed to combat fraud or misrepresentation due to false, in-
flated success claims by individual clinics.' 7 Unfortunately, the
legislature still has not given effective guidelines as to the status
of the embryo, the enforceability of embryo contracts, and how to
resolve disputes over embryo dispositions.
1. Legal Status of the Embryo
There are currently three views on the legal status of the
embryo: the right-to-life view, the property view, and special re-
spect status. The legal status of the embryo is important in
settling disputes over its disposition. In the absence of specific
legislation regarding IVF procedures, the judiciary has been un-
able to provide comprehensive, fair, and efficient resolutions to
disputes concerning frozen embryos.'08
Advocates of the right-to-life view consider an embryo a hu-
man entitled to all the rights of personhood.'0 9 Proponents of this
view find there is a duty to protect in vitro embryos from harm
by immediately transferring the embryo to a uterus; they con-
demn the use of cryopreservation because it is potentially detri-
mental to the embryo."0  They argue that embryos produced
through IVF are done so purposefully, not through a reproduc-
tive accident, and, therefore there should be no right to discard
them."' Advocates of this view also argue that these embryos
should be protected because of their potential for birth."'
Moreover, they distinguish Roe v. Wade on the basis that the
embryos' existence outside of the womb nullifies the abortion-
'05 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to -7 (1994).
106 See id. § 263a-1.
107 See S. REP. No. 102-452 at 2, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2565.
108 See infra notes 138-86 and accompanying text (discussing cases dealing with
embryo dispositions).
10 See Ahnen, supra note 100, at 1308-09.
110 See id.
. See id. at 1308. Right-to-life advocates assert that "in vitro embryos must be
transferred to a uterus and condemn[ ] any intervention before transfer that might
harm the embryo or is not therapeutic, such as freezing and embryo research." Id. at
1309.
112 See id. at 1308-09.
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related conflict between the woman's right to privacy and bodily
integrity.1
3
The American Fertility Society focused on the parties who
have an interest in the embryo rather than on the embryo itself
when it discussed the embryo-as-property view." In its purest
form, this view treats embryos much like any other form of per-
sonal property or tissue matter."5 This view has not found favor
with many commentators. 8
In 1984, the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility So-
ciety ("ECAFS") considered the competing views regarding the
legal and moral status of embryos and arrived at a compromise
between the right-to-life view and the embryo-as-property
13 See id.; Davidoff, supra note 19, at 137-38. IVF advocates contend that the
state interest is not compelling enough to deny the extension of the fundamental
right of procreation to noncoital procedures. See id As noted earlier, the cryogeni-
cally stored embryo is stored prior to the point at which the embryo develops a
nervous and organ system-therefore, the embryo is not conscious and cannot feel
pain. See id. "[Alt this stage of development only ten percent of all embryos,
whether in vivo or in vitro, will implant, and thirty to forty percent of those that
implant will spontaneously abort." Ahnen, supra note 100, at 1309. In addition, all
children who had been cryogenically preserved in their embryonic stage have been
born without any physical defect resulting from their embryonic preservation. See
id. at 1310. Medical experts believe that the natural selection process is responsible
for many of the in vitro embryos which do not survive the IVF process, just as many
in vivo embryos do not result in live births. See id. at 1309. They believe that these
embryos possess genetic or other abnormalities which cause them not to develop af-
ter fertilization or to spontaneously abort after embryo transfer. See id. at 1310.
114 See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989) (finding that the
cryopreservation agreement between the clinic and the couple created a bailor-
bailee relationship, particularly since language in the agreement referred to the pre-
zygotes as property).
.5 See, e.g., American Fertility Society, Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertiliza-
tion, 41 FERTILITY & STERILITY (No. 1) 12 (1984) (stating that "[i]t is understood
that the gametes and concepti are the property of the donors [thus, t]he donors
[ ]have the right to decide at their sole discretion the disposition of these
items . . ").
'16 Some feel even the "toned-down" view taken by the Warnock Committee,
which recommended that legislation provide for no "right of ownership," still treated
embryos too much like property in that it contemplated the licensed sale of embryos.
See, e.g., I. KENNEDY & A. GRUBB, MEDICAL LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 682 (1989)
(arguing that, what is ownership, "if it is not the right to control, including to dis-
pose of by sale, or otherwise?" and that effectively, the embryo is being treated as a
chattel).
Other commentators, however, treat this view more as an acknowledgment of
the status quo. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of
Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 455 (1990) ("Although the bundle of property
rights attached to one's ownership of an embryo may be more circumscribed than for
other things, it is an ownership or property interest nonetheless.").
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view."' The Committee adopted the positions set forth by the
Waller and Warnock committees, namely that:
[Tihe preembryo deserves respect greater than that accorded to
human tissue but not the respect accorded to actual persons.
The preembryo is due greater respect than any other human
tissue becuase [sic] of its potential to become a person and be-
cause of its symbolic meaning for many people. Yet, it should
not be treated as a person, because it has not yet developed the
features of personhood, is not yet established as developmen-
118tally individual, and may never realize its biologic potential.
In 1979, the Ethics Advisory Board of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, had issued a similar statement,
arguing that "the human embryo is entitled to profound respect;
but this respect does not necessarily encompass the full legal and
moral rights attributed to persons.""' The ECAFS did find, how-
ever, that the embryo's "potential to become a person.., limits
the "circumstances in which a preembryo may be discarded or
used in research."
120
2. State Legislation
Currently, three states-Illinois, Louisiana, and Pennsyl-
vania-regulate IVF. 2 The Illinois statute faced its first consti-
tutional challenge by a married couple seeking IVF treatment in
Smith v. Hartigan." The defendants contended that the in vitro
provision "both permits in vitro fertilization and preserves the
constitutional rights of women who have become pregnant either
naturally or through in vitro fertilization to terminate their
pregnancies,"1" while " 'protect[ing] the State's interest in hu-
117 See Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, Ethical Considera-
tion of the New Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY (No. 3) 30S
(Supp. 1, 1986) [hereinafter Ethical Consideration].
, Id. at 29S-30S.
119 Support of Human In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, 44 Fed. Reg.
35,033, 35,056 (Dep't H.E.W. 1979) (report and conclusions). As the issue of IVF be-
came politically entangled with the abortion controversies, the recommendations of
the Board were never acted upon and the Board itself was disbanded. See Pitrolo,
supra note 16, at 172.
120 Ethical Consideration, supra note 117, at 77S.
121 See ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38 7 81-26, § 6(7) (1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
9:121-9:133 (West 1997); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(e) (Purdon 1989).
122 556 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
23 Id. at 161. The defendants argued that "pregnancy termination" should be
defined as "non-reimplantation of an embryo conceived in vitro with the intention of
continuing the pregnancy in the womb, until delivery." Id.
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man life by prohibiting wilful exposure of embryos to harm,
[such] as by destructive laboratory experimentation.' "u Based
on their interpretation of the statute, the defendants concluded
that, "'to determine that [a] five-to-seven day old, nonviable con-
ceptus should not be reimplanted for any medical reason what-
soever is simply to participate in a lawful pregnancy termina-
tion.' "" Dismissing the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the court found that the statute, as interpreted by
the Attorney General, did not prohibit the IVF procedure in
which the couple sought to participate. 2 '
Smith did not address the constitutionality of experimental
research to improve IVF procedures, such as cryopreservation.
Seven years after Smith, that issue was touched upon in Lifchez
v. Hartigan,'7 wherein the same statute at issue in Smith was
found unconstitutional.' s The court stated that the failure of the
Illinois abortion law to define the terms "experimentation" and
"therapeutic" violated due process by rendering the statue so
vague that persons would not know if they were in violation of
the statute.12 9 In part the court based its holding on the statute's
infringement of a woman's right of privacy and reproductive
freedom. 3 '
In contrast to the controversial Illinois statute, Pennsylva-
nia's statute simply requires "persons conducting, or experiment-
ing in, in vitro fertilization" to regularly file reports on informa-
tion regarding the personnel -employed and the number of WF
procedures performed.''
The Louisiana statute, the most encompassing and stringent
124 Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
'2 Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
26 See id. at 164.
127 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill.). Physicians specializing in reproductive endocri-
nology and fertility counseling challenged the constitutionality of a provision of the
Illinois abortion law. Section 6(7) of the Illinois Abortion Law provided:
(7) No person shall sell or experiment upon a fetus produced by the fertili-
zation of a human ovum by a human sperm unless such experimentation is
therapeutic to the fetus thereby produced. Intentional violation of this sec-
tion is a Class A misdemeanor. Nothing in this subsection (7) is intended to
prohibit the performance of in vitro fertilization.
Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1363 (citing ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38 9 81-26, § 6(7) (1989)).
128 Id. at 1376.
129 See id. at 1364.
130 See id. at 1376-77.
'31 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(e) (Purdon 1989). Failure to submit the re-
ports results in a fine. See id.
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set of laws regarding IVF,1"2 has expressly recognized human
embryos as having legal rights.'33 The statute mandates that all
embryos be transferred to a uterus-either the IVF participants
themselves or donated to an "adoptive" uterus-thereby protect-
ing the embryo from being destroyed.' The statute states that
an embryo is, "a juridical person which shall not be intentionally
destroyed," 5 and affords the embryo, even at the one-cell stage,
the right to sue or be sued."6 The statute provides that a curator
may be appointed to protect the embryo's interests."' This stat-
ute will likely face a constitutional challenge in the near future
since it leaves open the possibility of stringent directives regard-
ing IVF procedures or even a complete ban on 1VF if the state
feels that the protection of the embryo at this stage in life is suf-
ficiently compelling.
3. Judicial Discretion
Due to the overall lack of comprehensive legislation in the
IVF field, courts have been given much discretion in resolving
disputes concerning embryo dispositions. Indicative of the re-
sulting judicial inconsistency are the three contrasting decisions
of the district, appellate, and supreme courts of Tennessee in
Davis v. Davis."' Each case confronted the issue of what should
be done with cryogenically preserved embryos when the gamete
providers disagree as to their disposition. Despite the fact that
each case involved custody and disposition of cryogenically pre-
132 See Leanne E. Murray, Note, Davis v. Davis: The Embryonic Stages of Pro-
creational Privacy, 14 PAcE L. REV. 567, 578-79 (1994) (comparing the Louisiana
statute to the Uniform Parentage Act).
1 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-9:133 (West 1997). Section 9:126 deems an
IVF human ovum as "a biological human being which is not the property of the
physician which acts as an agent of fertilization, or the facility which employs him
or the donors of the sperm and ovum." Id. § 9:126.
1 4 See id. § 9:129-30. Section 9:130 provides that "[i]f the in vitro fertilization
patients renounce, by notarial act, their parental rights for in utero implantation,
then the in vitro fertilized human ovum shall be available for adoptive implanta-
tion ..... Id. § 9:130. Note, however, that section 9:129 provides, "[a]n in vitro fertil-
ized human ovum that fails to develop further over a thirty-six hour period except
when the embryo is in a state of cryopreservation, is considered non-viable and is
not considered a juridical person." Id. § 9:129.
" See id. § 9:129.
116 See id. § 9:124.
137 See id. § 9:126.
"8 No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd No. 180,
1990 WL 10807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), affd 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
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served embryos following the parents' divorce,'39 each court
adopted a different theory as to the rights of the embryos, which
impacted greatly on their decisions as to the disposition of the
embryos.4 ° The trial court espoused a right-to-life view and
granted joint custody over the embryos to both Mr. and Mrs.
Davis with equal power to determine their disposition.' The
appellate court reversed the trial court's holding, and deter-
mined that the dispute should be resolved by bailment law, thus
adopting an embryo-as-property view.
'39 While married, Mr. and Mrs. Davis attempted to conceive a child via IVF due
to Mrs. Davis' infertility. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591. Mrs. Davis suffered five tu-
bal pregnancies during her attempts at natural conception. See id- The first preg-
nancy resulted in the removal of her right fallopian tube and the last, a near fatal
experience, resulted in her left fallopian tube rupturing. See id. Under the advice of
her physician, Mary Sue had her left fallopian tube ligated which rendered her un-
able to ever conceive naturally. See id. The couple attempted to adopt a child, but
when the adoption proceedings fell through they consulted with Dr. Ray King of the
Fertility Center of East Tennessee. See Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *2. After six un-
successful attempts over a course of three years, and at the expense of $35,000, they
decided to enter the new cryopreservation program at the clinic. See Davis, 842
S.W.2d at 591-92. Nine eggs removed from Mrs. Davis were fertilized with Mr.
Davis' sperm, producing nine embryos ready to be implanted. See id. at 592. Two
embryos were immediately transferred into Mrs. Davis' womb, and the remaining
seven were cryogenically stored for later implantation. See id. After the first im-
plantation failed, and prior to any attempts to utilize the remaining embryos, Mr.
Davis filed for divorce. At issue was the subsequent "custody" battle over the re-
maining cryogenically stored embryos. See iL Mrs. Davis had initially wanted the
embryos so that she could have them implanted in herself at a later date. At the
time of the appeal, both Mr. Davis and Mrs. Davis had remarried, and Mrs. Davis
had changed her mind about implanting the embryos into herself. She now sought
the authority to donate them to a childless couple. See id. at 590. Mr. Davis opposed
any future implantation of the embryos due to his profound interest in avoiding pro-
creation outside of the sanctity of marriage.
'40 See Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *9 (basing decision on the right-to-life theory);
Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *2 (applying property law to determine the status of em-
bryos); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590 (adopting a new theory by granting embryos spe-
cial respect status).
14' Adopting a right-to-life view, the trial court found that "human life begins at
the moment of conception... [and] that Mr. and Mrs. Davis have accomplished
their original intent to produce a human being to be known as their child." Davis,
1989 WL 140495, at *9. The court discussed the Supreme Court's holding in Roe v.
Wade and Webster but found that they did not apply to the case at bar because the
right to privacy afforded by those cases only extended to abortions. See id. at 10
.Therefore, in applying the doctrine of parens patriae, the court granted custody of
the embryos to Mrs. Davis so that "they be made available for implantation to as-
sure their opportunity for live birth." Id. at *11.
142 The Appellate Court rejected the right-to-life view. See Davis, 1990 WL
130807. The court instead relied upon the decision in York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. at
425, which determined that property law prevailed because a bailment situation
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The Tennessee Supreme Court recognized "the obvious im-
portance of the case in terms of the development of law regard-
ing the new reproductive technologies,"'43 and applied yet an-
other theory in determining the rights of the embryo.'" The
court adopted the view of the Ethics Advisory Committee, 45 the
special-respect status of the embryos, due to their "potential for
human life." 46 The court stated that the parties' constitutional
right to procreation must be balanced against the right to avoid
procreation. 14 The court analyzed the individual burdens that
would be imposed on both Mr. and Mrs. Davis, and concluded
that Mr. Davis's interest in avoiding procreation was more com-
pelling than Mrs. Davis's interest in having the embryos donated
to another couple.
148
The New York Court of Appeals confronted the issue of
preembryo disposition in Kass v. Kass.149  The court found no
existed between the gamete providers. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595-96.
143 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.
'" The Tennessee Supreme Court found the intermediate court's reliance on
York troubling since it implied that the rights of the would-be parents are in the na-
ture of a property interest. See id. at 596. The court equated the embryos with fe-
tuses, and noted that the Tennessee abortion statutes demonstrated that viable fe-
tuses in vivo are not afforded the same protection as persons. See id. at 595. In
particular, the court pointed to section 39-15-201 of the Tennessee Code, incorporat-
ing the trimester approach to abortions. See id.
145 See supra note 117-20 and accompanying text (discussing the view of the
Ethics Advisory Committee).
1'4 Id. at 597 (noting that Mr. and Mrs. Davis have decision-making interests in
the disposition of the embryos, but not property interests).
17 In relying on the Tennessee abortion statute, the court concluded that the
state's interest in potential life was not sufficient "to justify an infringement on the
gamete-providers' procreational autonomy." Id. at 602.
. See id. at 604. The court, therefore, awarded "custody" of the embryos to Mr.
Davis. In dicta, the court suggested that the result may have been different had
Mrs. Davis intended to use the embryos herself, but only if she had no other reason-
able opportunity to achieve parenthood. See id. at 604. Additionally, the court
opined as to the treatment and validity of pre-IVF contracts between progenitors.
See id. In order to provide guidance to future IVF parties, the court stated that a
contract between progenitors concerning the disposition of unused embryos should
be valid and enforced. See id. at 597. The court reasoned that this is consistent with
its conclusion that progenitors maintain a decision-making interest in the disposi-
tion of the embryos. See id. In determining that Mr. Davis' procreational rights out-
weighed those of Mrs. Davis the court stated that "[any disposition which results in
the gestation of the preembryos would impose unwanted parenthood on him, with
all of its possible financial and psychological consequences" Id. at 603. The court
noted that "[d]onation, if a child came of it, would rob him twice-his procreational
autonomy would be defeated and his relationship with his offspring would be prohib-
ited." Id. at 604.
19 No. 53, 1998 WL 225157 (N.Y. May 7, 1998).
440 [Vol. 72:417
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
need to adopt an analysis weighing the interests of the parties,
as in Davis, on the facts of Kass.5 ' Instead, the court relied on
the Davis court's approach that "[aigreements between progeni-
tors ... regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes should gen-
erally be presumed valid and binding, and enforced in any dis-
pute between them." As a result the court enforced two
agreements that Mr. and Mrs. Kass had executed as they
"unequivocally stated their [the Kasses'] intent" as to the desired
disposition of their cryopreserved embryos.'52
'6 See id. at *6 (noting that "for purposes of resolving the present appeal we
have no cause to decide whether the pre-zygotes are entitled to 'special respect' ").
The court found that constitutional considerations of privacy and bodily integrity
were not implicated in determining the disposition of pre-zygotes. See id. In Davis,
the court considered the man and woman engaged in the IVF process to be "entirely
equivalent gamete-providers." Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601.
5 Kass, 1998 WL 225157, at *6.
152 See id. at *7. Kass involved a dispute over the disposition of cryogenically
preserved embryos following the divorce of the couple. See id. at *3. Mrs. Kass
sought custody of the frozen embryos in order to try to achieve pregnancy through
IVF implantation in her own uterus. See id. Mr. Kass, on the other hand, wished to
have the embryos donated for use in embryo research. See id. In consent forms pro-
vided by the hospital, Mr. and Mrs. Kass had indicated their mutual desire to do-
nate them to the IVF Program for research. See id. at *1. The informed consent
document provided that their frozen pre-zygotes may "be disposed of by the IVF
Program for approved research investigation" in the event they were "unable to
make a decision regarding the disposition" of their pre-zygotes. Id. at *2. In their
divorce document, they agreed that the pre-zygotes should be disposed of according
to the terms of the consent document. See id. at *3. Subsequently, Mrs. Kass
changed her mind and was opposed to the destruction or release of the five pre-
zygotes. See id. Mr. Kass sought specific performance of that agreement. See id. De-
spite the execution of an agreement, the trial court awarded custody of the embryos
to Mrs. Kass. See Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Jan. 18, 1995),
rev'd, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997), affd No. 53, 1998 WL 225157 (N.Y. May 7,
1998). Relying on Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 114 (1973), and Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the trial court held that since in vivo and in vitro fer-
tilization are one in the same, the rights and wishes of Mrs. Kass must prevail. See
Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *4. The appeals court reversed the decision of the trial
court and stated that the trial court "committed a fundamental error... in equating
a prospective mother's decision whether to undergo [in vitro procedures] with a
pregnant woman's right to exercise exclusive control over the fate of her non-viable
fetus." Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 585 (App. Div. 1997), af'd No. 53, 1998 WL
225157 (N.Y. May 7, 1998). The Appellate Division stated that the trial court's reli-
ance on Roe v. Wade and Danforth was erroneous because those cases involved a
woman's "personal autonomy and bodily integrity." Id. (citing Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992)) (holding that the state may not impose an undue
burden on a woman's right to obtain an abortion). Relying on Davis, the Appellate
Division reasoned that a woman's "right to exercise virtually exclusive control over
her own body [and non-viable fetus] is not implicated in the IVF scenario" because,
prior to implantation, a woman's bodily integrity is not at issue. Id. at 586.
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4. A Need for Legislative Guidance
Judge Miller, dissenting from the Appellate Division's dec-
sion in Kass, urged the legislature to implement guidelines to
facilitate resolution of these conflicts in subsequent cases.'53 The
absence of clear legislation regarding the rights and duties of the
parties involved in the IVF process makes the enforceability of
IVF contracts questionable, thereby making uncertain the par-
ticipant's ability to control their reproductive options through
these contracts. In balancing the interests between the woman
who wishes to exercise her right to procreate against the man's
desire to avoid procreation, one party's constitutional rights will
take precedence.'55 With the increasing reliance by infertile
couples on IVF, and the lack of required embryo disposition
agreements, litigation over future disposition of embryos will in-
crease. In an effort to reduce litigation, legislation must be im-
plemented to provide a foundation upon which parties entering
into these agreements can rely.
Initially, the legislature must decide the status of embryos.
Overwhelmingly, the literature advocates the "special-respect"
status of the embryo.'56 Due to the embryo's potential for per-
"3 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 594 (Miller, J., dissenting) ("The legal, emotional,
and ethical nightmare resulting [from frozen embryo custody battles] demonstrates
the clear need for legislation mandating that in vitro fertilization clinics require the
execution of a standardized, binding agreement setting forth the parties' specific in-
tentions in the event of foreseeable changes in circumstances.... ")
" See Robertson, supra note 116, at 465 (arguing that preconception disposition
agreements should not be enforced because parties may not be fully informed, un-
derstand the legal implications of their choices, or have any real choice); Lee Kuo,
Comment, Lessons Learned from Great Britain's Human Fertilization and Embryol-
ogy Act: Should the United States Regulate the Fate of Unused Frozen Embryos?, 19
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1027, 1033-34 (1997) (questioning the enforceability of
preconception agreements because the participants may not contemplate the full
consequences of such agreements and the agreements may be entered into under
unconscionable circumstances); cf Kass, 1998 WL 225157, at *9 (enforcing a precon-
ception agreement which called for donation of cryopreserved pre-zygotes in the
event the parties were unable to decide on disposition).
1 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601 (stating that the right to procreate is of equal
significance to the right to avoid procreation subject to certain limits and protec-
tions).
1'5 See Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men Revisited or Sperm is Cheap, Eggs Are Not,
47 HASTINGS L.J. 1063, 1077 (1996) (disagreeing with the result in Davis because
the court should have valued the potential for life itself in the embryo); Robertson,
supra note 119, at 447 (contending that the early embryo should be accorded special
respect because it is genetically unique and has the potential for life); Dehmel, su-
pra note 21, at 1384 (noting that the "special-respect" view of frozen embryos has
wide support); Alise R. Panitch, Note, The Davis Dilemma: How to Prevent Battles
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sonhood, this is the proper status for the embryo." 7 The legisla-
ture must next determine whether to afford in vitro embryos
rights greater than those given to in vivo embryos. In light of
the fact that the courts recognize a woman's fundamental right
to terminate an in vivo pregnancy as an expression of her repro-
ductive freedom,158 it should also allow for the termination of an
in vitro embryo under those same freedoms.159 Arguably, a law
such as Louisiana's, which mandates implantation of the spare
embryos,6 0 does not impose gestational or child-rearing duties
because the embryo may be donated, but the burdens of psycho-
logical parenthood must be taken into consideration.16 The Roe
Court held that the fundamental right of privacy includes free-
dom in procreative choices, and allowed a woman to avoid the
physical, psychological, financial, and child-rearing burdens of
parenthood."2
Next, the legislature must address disputes that may arise
between the gamete providers. These disputes may be resolved
in different ways. First, the legislature may consider the Sweat
Equity Theory.' This theory favors awarding the embryos to
the woman because she undergoes the bulk of the physical bur-
dens of the IVF procedure.'" Because of the imbalance in the
Over Frozen Embryos, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 543, 561 (1991) (observing that the
Davis court seemed to adopt the view of most American and international schol-
ars-that pre-embryos have a special status). But see Carow, supra note 33, at 570
(fearing that special respect status for pre-embryos might cause courts to consider
the rights of the pre-embryos over those of gamete providers).
'7 See Robertson, supra note 116, at 447.
168 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870-71 (1992) (recognizing a
woman's fundamental right to abort her non-viable fetus, free from any undue inter-
ference from the state); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (noting that a
woman's right to privacy includes the right to an abortion).
159 But see Kass, 1998 WL 225157, at *6 (holding that the bodily integrity and
personal autonomy rule from Roe v. Wade is not implicated in IVF before implanta-
tion takes place).
'go See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text (stating that implantation
must be into the IVF participant or into an adoptive uterus).
161 See, e.g., Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603-04 (concluding that the burden of psycho-
logical consequences resulting from unwanted parenthood outweighed a desire to
donate pre-zygotes so an infertile couple may achieve pregnancy).
162 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
163 See Dehmel, supra note 21, at 1399; Tanya Feliciano, Note, Davis v. Davis:
What about Future Disputes?, 26 CONN. L. REV. 305, 347 (1993); Mary A. Totz,
Comment, What's Good for the Goose is Good for the Gander: Toward Recognition of
Men's Reproductive Rights, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 141, 171-72 (1994).
164 See Debmel, supra note 21, at 1399; Feliciano, supra note 163, at 347. It is
the woman who submits to medically risky and inconvenient procedures to remove
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amount of time and effort expended by gamete providers, this
theory recognizes that the woman has more invested and, thus,
should have the final say in the disposition of the embryo.165 This
theory appears to have gained favor, as it is similar to the
"bodily integrity" argument set forth in Danforth.66
Another possible resolution to these disputes is to recognize
the legality and enforceability of embryo disposition agreements.
In the absence of such agreements, an implied contract may be
enforced recognizing that the gamete providers entered into this
procedure for reproductive purposes. 6 7  Therefore, the party
seeking to enforce the agreement by providing for a means of
implantation should decide the fate of the embryo.
IV. GESTATIONAL SURROGACY
The introduction of a surrogate further complicates the IVF
controversy because it implicates another fundamental right.'68
Reproductive technology is at the stage where it is possible for a
child to have five parents: the egg and sperm donors (genetic
parents), the gestational surrogate, the intended mother, and the
intended father. 69 Surrogacy continues the disassociation which
began with the development of the birth control pill: sexual in-
tercourse from conception, procreation from human involvement,
and, now, gestation from motherhood.1
70
the eggs, after which she is relegated to bedrest for a few days, whereby the man
merely provides the sperm. See Totz, supra note 163, at 170 n.143.
"' See Dehmel, supra note 21, at 1399; Feliciano, supra note 167, at 347.
1 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (stating that a
woman has a greater interest in deciding whether to abort a fetus as she bears the
physical burden). But see Dehmel, supra note 21, at 1399 (noting that this argument
is flawed due to the happening of unforeseen circumstances affecting the parties'
agreement and that it ignores the intent of the parties); Feliciano, supra note 163,
at 347 (noting that scholars have rejected this argument because no bodily integrity
is involved if there was no implantation of the embryos).
16 See Dehmel, supra note 21, at 1398 (noting that the ultimate goal is implan-
tation); Feliciano, supra note 163, at 346 (noting that an implied contract signifies
that the participants intend to be parents).
'6 This Note does not address the constitutionality of surrogacy agreements.
This issue is beyond the scope of the paper. This section, in determining the need for
legislation regarding disputes between the intended parents and the third-party
surrogate, proceeds on the assumption that the legislature will not ban surrogacy
agreements outright.
169 See, e.g., Jaycee B. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 696 (Ct. App. 1996)
(involving a child support order served on the intended father by the intended
mother in a gestational surrogacy case involving anonymous gamete donors).
170 See Sandra Anderson Garcia, Sociocultural and Legal Implications of Creat-
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The first test of gestational surrogacy arose in Johnson v.
Calvert,7' where the court had to decide whether Mrs. Calvert,
as a genetic mother, or Anna Johnson, a gestational surrogate,
was the "natural" mother of a child produced in an IVF proce-
dure." The trial court found that the Calverts "were the child's
'genetic, biological and natural' father and mother" that Johnson
"had no 'parental' rights to the child, and [that] the [surrogacyl
contract was legal and enforceable."73 Johnson's role as gesta-
tional host for the Calvert's child may be compared to that of a
foster parent-she provided care and protection for the child
during the period which its natural mother was unable to do so.
The court relied heavily on the fact that the genetic parents were
also the intended parents.'74
In upholding the trial court's decision, the California Su-
preme Court examined the express intent of the parties involved.
The court relied on the parties' surrogacy agreement as indica-
tive of their intent, 75 and determined that California law favored
the Calvert's claim.'76 The court concluded that both Mrs. Calvert
and Anna Johnson had "presented acceptable proof of maternity"
under the applicable statute.
7
ing and Sustaining Life through Biomedical Technology, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 469, 497
(1996) (outlining various disassociations taking place with the development of tech-
nology).
851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
172 See id. at 778 (outlining the agreement that Johnson was to be paid $10,000
plus life insurance benefits for her role as a surrogate). The Calverts and Anna
Johnson entered into a surrogacy agreement whereby Ms. Johnson agreed to carry
their fertilized embryo to term and to relinquish all rights to the child at birth. See
id. The embryo, formed by fertilizing Mrs. Calvert's egg with Mr. Calvert's egg, was
implanted into Ms. Johnson's uterus. See id. During the course of the pregnancy,
Ms. Johnson and the Calverts disagreed about Johnson's life insurance provision
and nondisclosure of previous miscarriages and stillbirths. See id. The relationship
deteriorated to a point where Ms. Johnson threatened to keep the child after it was
born. See id. The Calverts sought a declaration declaring them the legal parents of
the unborn child, and Johnson filed a counter-petition seeking to be declared the le-
gal mother of the child. See id.
173 Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373 (Ct. App. 1992).
174 See id. at 376-77.
171 See Calvert, 851 P.2d at 782 (expressing the inability to decide the case with-
out inquiring as to the intent of the parties).
'76 See id. (holding "Crispina [Ms. Calvert] is the child's natural mother").
177 Id. at 782. The Uniform Parentage Act (the Act) was adopted in California as
was part of a package of legislation introduced in 1975 as Senate Bill No. 347. See
id. at 778. "[The legislation's purpose was to eliminate the legal distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate children." Id. at 778-79. (explaining that the adoption of
the act was in response to United States Supreme Court decisions holding that le-
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In McDonald v. McDonald,"'8 a New York court relied on the
Calvert decision and held that the gestational mother of two
children, born during the marriage, was to be deemed the
"natural" mother of the children."9 The court focused on the in-
tent of the parties when it determined that a mother who util-
ized donated eggs in order to have a child is the legal mother
with all accompanying rights.'5 °
An Ohio court in Belsito v. Clark,18" ' disagreed with the in-
tent-of-the-parties analysis established in Calvert and McDon-
ald, and determined that a genetic connection was stronger than
a gestational one.' 82 The court held that the gestational mother
could be considered the natural parent only if she obtained the
gitimate and illegitimate children deserve equal treatment). The California Civil
Code § 7003 provided that a parent and child relationship "may be established by
proof of [the mother] having given birth to the child, or under [the Act]." CAL. CIVIL
CODE § 7003 (Deering 1986), quoted in Calvert, 851 P.2d 780. The Calvert court ex-
plained the breadth of the Act then in force, and explained that under § 7015 of the
Act "insofar as practicable, provisions applicable to the father and child relationship
apply in an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child
relationship." Calvert, 851 P.2d at 780. The Calvert court applied the sections rele-
vant to a father and child relationship to determine the mother and child relation-
ship. See id. Section 7004(a) of the code refers to section 621 of the Evidence Code
then in effect, now embodied in a parallel section of the Family Code, which stated
that "if the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the
evidence based upon blood tests... are that the husband is not the father of the
child, the question of paternity of the husband shall be resolved accordingly." CAL.
EVID. CODE § 621(b) (Deering 1986), quoted in Calvert, 851 P.2d at 780 n.6. The Cal-
vert court explained that as both women established a mother-child relationship,
one a gestational relationship and the other a genetic one, a purely legal determi-
nation remained to determine which woman was the natural mother. See id. at 781.
The court, therefore, needed to consider evidence beyond the statutory language in
determining natural motherhood. "When more than one woman share the biological
indicators of motherhood-genetic relationship and gestation-the woman who in-
tended to bring the child into being and raise it as her own child is the natural
mother under California law." Teresa Abell, Note, Gestational Surrogacy: Intent-
Based Parenthood in Johnson v. Calvert, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1429, 1430 (1994); see
Calvert, 851 P.2d at 782-84 (explaining that the child's existence is due to the in-
tentions upon which the Calvert's acted on). The court used a modified "but-for"
analysis--"[b]ut-for" the Calvert's acts in bringing about the pregnancy, "the child
would not have existed." Id.
'7" 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1994)
1 See id. at 480 (distinguishing this case from Calvert by noting that this case
involved a true "egg-donation" scenario).
IS See id. (calling the Calvert court's rationale "persuasive").
"' 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Summit County 1994).
18 See id. at 766 (rejecting the Calvert test due to its failure to protect individ-
ual rights).
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"consent of the genetic provider.""
As evidenced by these cases, the legislature must define and
clarify artificially created parental relationships."M In weighing
the individual rights of the various parties, it becomes apparent
that intent-based determinations of parenthood are most likely
to achieve the goal of personal autonomy. As a surrogate freely
enters into a contract knowing that she ultimately would sur-
render her parental rights, these rights are not abrogated by the
enforcement of these agreements." It has been stated:
[Liegal rules governing modern procreative arrangements and
parental status should recognize the importance and the legiti-
macy of individual efforts to project intentions and decisions
into the future. Where such intentions are deliberate, explicit
and bargained for, where they are the catalyst for reliance and
expectations... they should be honored." 6
This is logical since the use of reproductive technology is an
unambiguous indicator of intent. The intended parents should
prevail in disputes over the surrogates because they originated
the idea of having the child. The process of childbearing begins
with the decision to employ the steps necessary to procreate.
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
As technology develops, IVF procedures advance rapidly. As
the procedures drift farther from traditionally accepted notions
of procreation, questions arise as to what degree couples should
be allowed to manipulate their reproductive potential.187 Propo-
183 id.
'1' See Jean M. Eggen, The "Orwellian Nightmare" Reconsidered: A Proposed
Regulatory Framework for the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L. REV.
625, 693 (proposing regulatory action in areas of reproductive technologies on a
graduated scale, beginning with areas with a high state interest to low interest in
individual rights); see also Jamie Levitt, Biology, Technology and Geneology: A Pro-
posed Uniform Surrogacy Legislation, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451, 454
(1992) (proposing uniform surrogacy legislation in the wake of Johnson v. Calvert).
18. See, e.g., Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784 ("The payments to Anna under the
[surrogacy] contract were meant to compensate her for her services in gestating the
fetus and undergoing labor, rather than for giving up parental' rights to the child.").
18 Majorie M. Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood:
An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297, 302-03 (1990).
' One future procedure currently gaining much attention and debate is cloning
or, more specifically, "blastomere separation." Mona S. Amer, Comment, Breaking
the Mold: Human Embryo Cloning and its Implications for a Right to Individuality,
43 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1660 (1996). Scientists developed blastomere separation to
"help to provide a larger number of embryos than eggs, while necessitating the few-
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nents of IVF argue that the right to procreation extends to all
available procedures which help facilitate reproduction." The
legal implications of cloning have not yet been addressed and
present questions as to who has the right to the cloned embryo-
the parents or the child who shares the identical genetic makeup
of the clone.189 This procedure is most likely only to be employed
through private clinics and other organizations.1" The utiliza-
tion of embryo cloning may raise concern of cloned children being
created against the will of the first child. The legislature must
clearly resolve questions relating to embryo dispositions, not
only in present situations, as in the disposition of cryopreserved
embryos in the event of divorce or death, but in future disputes,
as may be evidenced by the cloning scenario.
CONCLUSION
The growing demand for assistance in reproduction is not
likely to abate in the near future. The constitutional right to
procreation should extend to noncoital procreation because
"coital infertility does not render a couple inadequate as chil-
drearers." 9' Perhaps the fact that people are willing to endure a
painful, expensive and time-consuming process in order to facili-
tate their goal of raising a family is evidence that their interest
in procreation is as great or greater than one who can reproduce
coitally.92 Therefore, the interests of the infertile in "bearing,
begetting or parenting offspring is as worthy of respect as that of
est number of invasive procedures." Id. at 1664.
'8' See, e.g., id. at 1688 (concluding that because embryo splitting (cloning) in-
creases the success rates of in vitro fertilization, it should not be completely
banned).
'8 See id. at 1661 (raising the question of "whether the children created from
[IVF] have any property rights over the other cloned embryos by virtue of their
shared genetic identity").
'90 See id. at 1686 (stating that "[ciloning will be privately funded and per-
formed, making it harder to ensure that each child born from this procedure is pro-
tected from cloning and leaving future generations only the court system to uphold
their right to individuality").
191 Robertson, supra note 10, at 290.
192 See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *25 (Tenn. Cir.
Sept. 21, 1989) (noting testimony given by Mrs. Davis as to the "many injections she
received or administered to herself to prepare her body reproductive system for the
removal of her eggs in preparation for the IVF procedures; and... the painful,
physically trying, emotionally and mentally taxing ordeals she endured"), rev'd, No.
180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), affd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn.
1992).
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the coitally fertile."93 "Only serious harm to the interests of oth-
ers, not avoidable by less restrictive means, should justify inter-
ference with such a fundamental choice.""
Legislation is needed in the field of IVF to define the rights
of individual parties involved in the fertilization process. This
will ensure that the clinics do not discriminate on the basis of
marital status or sexual preference. Affimative guidelines re-
garding the rights of the individuals in the surrogacy context will
provide people with notice of their rights upon entering these
programs. Hopefully, infertile individuals will be better pre-
pared to utilize these procreative options.
Nicole L. Cucci
"3 Robertson, supra note 10, at 290.
194 Id.
1998]
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